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A contrasting causal hypothesis is the 
following: despite the fl uid population 
structure, people were still able to seek 
out and preferentially interact with kin. 
Each individual, while cooperating with 
campmates for mutual benefi t, had 
their own kinship network spanning 
multiple camps, and genuinely altruistic 
behaviour mostly occurred within 
kinship networks, not across them. 
This is, in effect, the hypothesis that 
early human populations were high 
K, low G. Studies of contemporary 
hunter-gatherers show that interactions 
between kin from different camps are 
more frequent than interactions between 
non-kin [28]. This is hardly surprising, 
but it suggests the high K, low G 
hypothesis merits further exploration.
These examples show how K-G 
space can help us articulate and 
compare empirical hypotheses. Like 
Maynard Smith’s original proposal, it 
points empirical biologists towards 
the questions that matter, though the 
questions are not quite the same as 
Maynard Smith’s: To what extent is 
genetic correlation between social 
partners explained by kinship? Are 
groups clearly in evidence, and how 
stable and well-bounded are they?
We need to move away from the 
1960s view of kin selection and group 
selection as wholly different processes. 
But theorists also need to move away 
from insisting that, because these 
concepts are equivalent when viewed 
as statistical partitions of change, 
one of them can be dispensed with 
altogether. This has led to a stalemate 
in which theorists from the two camps 
continue to disagree, but without being 
clear as to where the disagreement lies. 
We should hold on to both terms as 
useful labels for overlapping regions of 
K-G space, while being pluralistic about 
the methods we use to analyse the 
processes in those regions.
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Kin selection and 
altruism
Tomas Kay, Laurent Lehmann, 
and Laurent Keller
“You cannot divorce kin selection from 
neo-Darwinism, any more than you 
can divorce the Pythagorean theorem 
from Euclidean geometry.” 
Richard Dawkins, 
An Appetite for Wonder
Natural selection is predicated on 
the ‘struggle for existence’: life is 
short, cruel and, whether through 
predation, disease or starvation, often 
ends traumatically. It would seem 
that in such a dog-eat-dog world, 
organisms ought to act selfi shly, and 
avoid reducing their fi tness (expected 
survival and reproductive success) by 
expending time and energy helping 
others. Put another way, alleles that 
increase the probability of altruism — 
a behavior whose expression 
increases the fi tness of recipients 
while decreasing that of the actor — 
should decrease in frequency across 
generations and ultimately disappear.
But altruism as so defi ned is 
prevalent in nature (Figure 1). One 
type of such apparently paradoxical 
behavior is documented in over 220 
bird and 120 mammal species, where 
self-sacrifi cing individuals forego 
reproduction to assist other group 
members. In these taxa, altruists are 
typically young individuals who help 
their parents to rear their younger 
siblings. A more extreme case 
occurs in social insects, where some 
individuals, the ‘workers’, irreversibly 
commit themselves to sterility (Box 1). 
Some ant species form colonies 
with in excess of a million sterile 
workers specialized on tasks such 
as nursing the young, foraging for 
food and defending the nest, while 
reproduction is restricted to one or 
few queens.
The notion of self-sacrifi ce to help 
others has long attracted attention. 
It is extolled by all major religions 
(for example, “thou shalt open thine 
hand wide unto him, and shalt surely 
lend him suffi cient for his need”, 
Primer
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Deuteronomy 15:8) and discussed 
by eminent philosophers: lauded by 
some (for example, “the moral law 
causes the people to follow [their 
leader] regardless of their lives, 
undismayed by any danger.”, Sun 
Tzu) while derided by others (for 
example, “to choose instinctively, 
what is harmful to yourself, to be 
tempted by ‘disinterested’ motives, 
this is practically the formula for 
decadence... people are done 
for when they become altruistic”, 
Nietzsche). The same notion has 
perplexed both economists and 
biologists. Darwin was aware of the 
problem that the existence of sterile 
workers posed to natural selection, 
terming them his “one special 
diffi culty”. He devoted signifi cant time 
to documenting altruistic behaviors 
and, with remarkable prescience, 
noted that: “the diffi culty, though 
appearing insuperable, is lessened, 
or as I believe disappears when it 
is remembered that selection may 
be applied to the family”. Despite 
Darwin’s attention, the evolutionary 
explanation of altruism remained 
obscure until W. D. Hamilton provided 
a pivotal insight. 
To understand the genetic evolution 
of any trait, it is important to consider 
the average fi tness of all individuals 
in the population bearing an allele 
responsible for producing a change 
in that trait value. Hamilton pointed 
out that a help-inducing allele will 
increase in frequency when rb – c > 
0, where –c is the average effect of 
the help-inducing allele on the fi tness 
of its bearer, b is the average effect 
on the fi tness of recipients and r is 
the genetic relatedness between 
actor and recipients. The relatedness 
coeffi cient r measures the extent to 
which a recipient of helping is more 
likely than a random individual in the 
population to carry the help-inducing 
allele. This elegant formalization 
emphasizes how an allele resulting 
in a fi tness cost to its bearer (c > 
0) can nevertheless be favored by 
selection if the correlated fi tness 
benefi ts on other bearers of the allele 
(rb > 0) outweigh the cost. Imagine 
two siblings. On average they have a 
50% chance of having inherited the 
same allele at any given locus (full 
sibling relatedness = 0.5). An allele 
that induces an altruistic behavior 
between siblings will therefore spread 
if the benefi t to the recipient sibling 
is at least twice the cost to the acting 
individual.
A key feature of Hamilton’s original 
(1964) model is its frequency-
independence: under weak selection, 
that is where phenotypic differences 
have small fi tness effects, rb – c > 0 
holds for all population frequencies 
of the allele increasing altruism. 
Hamilton referred to this consistency 
as “a gift from God” because it means 
that the same rule explains both the 
initial spread of a new allele and its 
eventual fi xation in the population. 
The rule can therefore be applied to 
successive mutations elaborating a 
trait, thereby explaining the gradual 
evolution of quantitative altruistic 
phenotypes. An equilibrium is reached 
when rb – c = 0, which provides 
a defi ning and practically useful 
characterization of an evolutionary 
stable phenotype. The frequency-
independence of Hamilton’s rule 
at the allele level applies to all 
quantitative phenotypes under weak 
selection, and has been shown to 
even hold when the phenotypes of 
actor and recipient interact (as under 
any realistic social interaction) and 
in demographically complex and 
spatially structured populations. This 
is miraculous because intuitively one 
would expect frequency-dependent 
phenotypes to result in frequency-
dependent selection, under which 
gradual Darwinian evolution is likely to 
break down.
The true generality of Hamilton’s 
rule is rarely understood. Kin 
selection is sometimes thought 
of as an esoteric counterpart to 
natural selection, useful only for 
understanding interactions within 
family units. The reality is that in any 
population where dispersal is limited 
in space, even to the slightest degree, 
interacting individuals will have r > 0 
Figure 1. Paradigmatic examples of altruistic phenotypes explained by kin selection. 
(A) An alarm-calling Belding’s ground squirrel. Squirrels emit costly calls more frequently when 
surrounded by a higher proportion of relatives. (B) Two Formica ant sisters (a worker and a queen) 
who differ markedly in morphology, longevity and reproductive potential. Sterile workers have 
only evolved in highly related groups. (C) Pied kingfi shers. In this species, young individuals often 
‘stay at home’ to help their parents rear younger siblings. Relatedness determines both who in-
dividuals help and the amount of help provided. (D) A multicellular slime mold fruiting body (left: 
SEM; right: light micrograph cross-section). The once free-living cells in the stem sacrifi ce their 
reproductive success to increase that of other cells. Relatedness in these structures is typically 
very high. Photographs are reproduced courtesy of (A) Ron Wolf; (B) Laurent Keller; (C) Johan 
Kok; and (D) Richard Blanton and Mark Grimson.
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and phenotypic evolution will be 
affected by the indirect component 
of fi tness (rb). This applies to any 
trait, but particularly to social ones, 
like inbreeding avoidance, dispersal 
strategies, competitive traits or sex-
ratio evolution. Further, kin selection 
subsumes classical natural selection, 
which represents the special case 
where all interacting individuals are 
completely unrelated (r = 0) so only 
the direct fi tness effect (–c) matters 
for selection. Additionally, because 
Hamilton’s rule reconciles gradual 
Darwinian evolution with particulate 
Mendelian inheritance for all traits, 
it bolsters the modern synthesis 
and extends it to the realm of social 
interactions. The rule therefore unifi es 
social evolution with quantitative 
genetics, ecology and long-term 
adaptive dynamics by providing a 
simple description of the direction of 
microevolution under weak selection. 
As details of genetic underpinnings 
can be omitted, the rule is readily 
applicable to behavioral ecology and 
social evolution.
Following Hamilton’s key insight, 
there has, unfortunately, been 
substantial confusion surrounding 
the term altruism. Trivers coined the 
term ‘reciprocal altruism’ to describe 
how seemingly altruistic behavior can 
evolve over reciprocal interactions (in 
which partners alternately help one 
another). But behaviors with a short-
term loss and long-term gain are not 
truly altruistic as they increase the 
actors Darwinian fi tness. Further work 
showed ‘reciprocal altruism’ or, more 
accurately, ‘reciprocity’ to be one of 
many mechanisms for the evolution of 
non-altruistic cooperation (a behavior 
whose expression increases the fi tness 
of recipients and that of the actor). 
Other mechanisms include cooperation 
as the by-product of a self-interested 
act, and enforced cooperation through 
the punishment of non-cooperation. 
In all these cases, cooperation readily 
evolves because it provides direct 
fi tness benefi ts (–c > 0). Importantly, 
there is currently not a single 
theoretical model which shows that 
altruism can evolve between unrelated 
individuals.
Further confusion arose because 
some authors misunderstood the 
kin selection model or wrongly 
claimed to have found an alternative 
situation conducive to the evolution 
of altruism. This is well illustrated 
by the group selection versus kin 
selection controversy. The general 
idea of group selection models is to 
use a multi-level approach to partition 
selection into components of within 
group and between group selection. 
Contrary to what is sometimes 
claimed, however, group selection 
models are not fundamentally 
different from classical kin selection 
models and it is possible in every 
instance to translate one approach 
to the other without disturbing the 
mathematics describing the net result 
of selection. 
Other examples include the so-
called spatial, lattice, or evolutionary 
graph models, where individuals are 
positioned on a grid (or represented 
as nodes in a network) and interact 
with nearest-neighbors to produce 
offspring which disperse locally. Here 
too, authors have claimed novelty, but 
once the mathematical or simulation 
smoke-screen is blown away, the life-
cycle assumptions of these models 
often entail altruistic interactions 
occurring exclusively between 
siblings or parent–offspring pairs. 
Thus, the outcome of these models is 
merely a less general reincarnation of 
Hamilton’s original insight.
A good theory must provide novel 
predictions and fi t with data. Kin 
selection has performed remarkably 
well, as illustrated by the following 
paradigmatic examples. In birds and 
mammals, individuals are more likely 
to warn relatives about the approach 
of a predator. For example, when 
groups of Belding’s ground squirrels 
are threatened, some individuals 
stand on their hind legs and emit 
a high-pitched squeak. Callers 
likely incur a cost by increasing 
their conspicuousness. Individuals 
are more likely to give these alarm 
calls when surrounded by close 
relatives. Moreover, females call more 
frequently than males, which makes 
sense given that dispersal is male-
biased resulting in higher relatedness 
of females than males to neighbors.
Cooperative breeding is 
broadly restricted to kin-based 
groups. Under monogamy, a focal 
individual’s relatedness to siblings 
is as high as to its own offspring. As 
polygamy increases, an individual’s 
relatedness to siblings decreases. 
Accordingly, across over 250 bird 
species, cooperative breeding is 
associated with low promiscuity, and 
in cooperatively breeding species, 
the level of helping covaries with 
promiscuity. In pied kingfi shers, for 
example, relatedness determines both 
whom an individual helps and the 
Box 1. Kin selection and eusociality.
The most extreme altruism in nature is observed in eusocial insect colonies, 
where one or few individuals produce all offspring, while others are permanently 
sterile. Hamilton initially conceived kin selection as a framework to understand 
the evolution of such a fascinating system. Broadly, this is now understood: In 
a monogamous population, individuals are, on average, as related to siblings 
(0.5) as they are to their own offspring (0.5). Consequently, under this mating 
system, if the benefi t of helping at the maternal nest (b) is greater than the cost of 
forgoing reproduction (c), selection will favor reproductive altruism. The ratio of 
b:c depends on a number of ecological parameters including the mortality rate, 
the ease with which a new nest can be founded, and the availability of resources 
within the maternal nest. At the genetic level, an allele which always induces 
sterility can never spread. Instead, sterility must be expressed probabilistically. 
Thus, sterility is likely to be a quantitative phenotype that can evolve gradually by 
small, stepwise transformations caused by allelic substitutions. In social insects, 
caste fate is typically determined environmentally, for example based on larval 
diet, and not genetically. There are, however, special cases where caste fate is 
entirely genetically determined. Some Messor and Pogonomyrmex harvester ant 
species, for example, comprise two interdependent genetic lineages. Queens 
mate with males of both lineages, and pure-lineage eggs develop as new queens 
while mixed-lineage eggs develop as workers. Here, while caste is genetically 
determined, it is not particular alleles which bias development but rather 
heterozygosity, or particular allelic combinations at different loci.
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amount of help provided. Additionally, 
across species with intermediate 
levels of promiscuity, the strength of 
kin discrimination increases with the 
benefi t of helping b.
Numerous phylogenetic analyses 
have revealed that the major 
evolutionary transition to eusociality in 
Hymenoptera (ants, bees and wasps), 
as well as cooperative breeding in 
vertebrates, evolved in highly related 
(mother–offspring) groups. There 
are exceptional ant species in which 
relatedness between nestmates is 
low; however, this results from a 
secondary increase in queen number 
long after the evolution of worker 
sterility. Monogamy is also the rule 
of thumb in termites, where multiple 
breeders occur only in evolutionarily 
derived lineages. In both termites and 
eusocial Hymenoptera the benefi t of 
raising siblings instead of offspring 
typically comes from the increased 
nest-defense capability of larger 
groups, or insurance against the 
mortality of any single care-giver.
Although high relatedness favors 
altruism, potential confl icts persist in 
kin groups because group members 
are not genetically identical and may 
attempt to favor the propagation of 
their own genes at the expense of 
other group members. Confl ict can 
occur over access to reproduction or 
over resource allocation among group 
members. Paradoxically, while kin 
selection was proposed to explain the 
evolution of altruism, the outcomes 
of within-group confl ict provide some 
of the theory’s most compelling 
evidence. For example, kin selection 
predicts that in social insect 
colonies relatedness determines 
the value of new queens and males 
to other colony members. Social 
Hymenoptera have a haplodiploid 
system of sex-determination, where 
unfertilized (haploid) eggs develop 
as males whereas fertilized (diploid) 
eggs develop as females. Under this 
system, full worker sisters share half 
of their maternally inherited genes, 
and all paternally inherited genes. 
With brothers, workers share half 
of their maternally inherited genes 
but never any paternally inherited 
genes since males have no father. 
Queens, however, share half of their 
genes with both sons and daughters. 
This results in genes in queens and 
workers differently valuing new males 
and females, with workers preferring 
a more female-biased sex ratio. Kin 
selection therefore predicts a confl ict 
between queens and workers over the 
colony sex ratio: consistent with this 
prediction, and with workers winning 
out, many ant species have a female-
biased sex ratio, which workers 
achieve by selectively eliminating 
male brood.
Kin selection further predicts that 
confl ict over the sex ratio should 
covary with the number of males a 
queen mates. Under haplodiploid 
sex-determination, multiple mating 
decreases the relatedness between 
the workers in a nest, but not 
between workers and their brothers. 
Consequently, under worker control, 
colonies headed by a multiply-mated 
queen should produce a higher 
proportion of males. If the queen is in 
control, however, the sex investment 
ratio should be independent of the 
number of times she mates as this 
does not infl uence her relatedness 
to offspring. This prediction was 
confi rmed in studies comparing the 
colony-level sex ratios in species with 
variable breeding structure. In several 
species, workers in colonies headed 
by a singly-mated queen eliminate 
a high proportion of male brood 
resulting in a strongly female-biased 
colony sex ratio. Contrastingly, in 
colonies headed by a multiply-mated 
queen, male brood persists. This 
creates a population-level pattern 
known as a split sex ratio, with some 
colonies producing mostly males and 
others producing mostly females. 
There are, however, some species 
which exhibit no apparent association 
between sex ratio and colony-level 
relatedness. In these species, queens 
can apparently bias the sex ratio in 
their favor by, for example, limiting 
the number of female eggs produced. 
Remarkably, the predictions of 
population-level female-biased sex 
ratio and of colony-level split sex 
ratios were predicted a priori by kin 
selection.
For a long time, kin selection was 
primarily used to understand the 
evolution of altruism in vertebrates 
and insects, and that of eusocial 
insect colonies. Over recent years, 
kin selection has been applied 
more broadly across the tree of 
life, leading to numerous advances. 
Some species of plant seem capable 
of discriminating kin from non-kin 
and investing less heavily in root 
development when pot-sharing with 
kin. Microbes are surprisingly social: 
they cooperate to perform an array 
of tasks including nourishment, 
movement, communication and the 
production of multicellular bodies. 
The microbial social landscape 
differs from that of vertebrates and 
insects because, rather than kinship 
categories such as full-sibling and 
half-sibling, the maxim is whether or 
not partners are clonemates. 
Interestingly, several microbes have 
been demonstrated to discriminate 
based on similarity at a particular 
locus. For example, the bacterium 
Proteus mirabilis swarms (a type 
of motility) over solid surfaces. 
Swarming is mediated by the six-
gene locus ids: cells carrying the 
same alleles swarm together while 
boundaries form between swarms 
of strains with alternative alleles. 
Kin selection has proven particularly 
useful to understanding such 
microbial interactions: relatedness 
affects diverse behaviors including 
nutrient uptake strategy in 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, altruistic 
multicellular stalk formation in 
Dictyostelium discoideum and toxin 
production in Escherichia coli. 
Kin selection was also critical to 
the major evolutionary transition 
to multicellular life. This transition 
is functionally analogous to the 
evolution of eusocial colonies, 
with workers representing somatic 
cells and queens representing the 
germ line. Here too, relatedness is 
paramount with clonal lineages being 
more likely than nonclonal lineages 
to evolve sterile cells, more likely to 
transition to obligate multicellularity, 
and typically forming multicellular 
bodies with both more cells and more 
cell types. 
In conclusion, kin selection 
theory is one of the most signifi cant 
advances in evolutionary biology 
since Darwin and provides a modern, 
gene-centered representation of 
natural selection. The theory was 
pioneered by W. D. Hamilton, and 
across subsequent decades biologists 
have clarifi ed and vastly extended the 
theory and its range of application, 
R442  Current Biology 29, R425–R473, June 3, 2019 © 2019 Elsevier Ltd.
which, in addition to the discussed 
examples, includes genomic 
imprinting, pathogen virulence, inter-
generational transfer, menopause 
and others. This very strong and 
integrative framework continues to 
provide exciting insights to domains 
far from its roots. Many remaining 
lacunas are mechanistic: little is 
currently known about how altruistic 
traits are produced developmentally; 
how they can be learned; or of their 
genetic architecture in eukaryotes. 
Further investigation along these lines 
will prove fruitful.
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and cheating in 
microbes
Parker Smith and Martin Schuster*
Communication and cooperation 
are not restricted to complex, higher 
organisms. Microbes, too, perform 
a variety of collective, multicellular 
behaviors, including biofi lm formation, 
quorum sensing, nutrient acquisition, 
and dispersal. The products of these 
microbial cooperative behaviors 
are generally referred to as public 
goods. Here we describe the nature 
of microbial public goods, the 
associated problem of cheating, and 
ways in which microbes maintain 
public goods in the face of cheating. 
We highlight work in a growing fi eld 
at the interface of microbiology, 
evolution, and ecology that combines 
multiple approaches in experimental 
evolution, genetics, and mathematical 
modeling.
Public goods
The concept of public goods is rooted 
in economics. Examples of economic 
public goods are national defense, 
public parks, street lighting, and 
waste-water treatment plants. They are 
fi nanced by tax revenues and are freely 
available to all citizens. Analogously, 
the defi ning characteristic of public 
goods in the context of social evolution 
is that they are costly to produce 
for the individual and are benefi cial 
to all members of the local group or 
population.
In microbial cooperation, public 
goods are loosely defi ned as 
compounds or functions that provide 
a collective benefi t, generally 
through release into the extracellular 
environment. Microbial public goods 
take many forms (Figure 1 and Table 1): 
They range from large proteins to small 
metabolites; they may be actively 
secreted or they may passively 
diffuse from the producing cell. For 
example, extracellular enzymes 
degrade polymers into smaller 
fragments that can be taken up by 
individual cells, siderophores scavenge 
iron in depleted environments, 
Primer biosurfactants promote group motility 
over surfaces, toxins injure host 
tissues to release nutrients, and 
antibiotics harm competing microbes. 
Exopolysaccharides and proteins 
form a protective extracellular matrix 
in bacterial biofi lms, and secreted 
signaling molecules coordinate the 
behavior of the population in a process 
termed quorum sensing. A well-studied 
microbial species exhibiting all these 
properties is the opportunistic bacterial 
pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa, 
which is often associated with chronic 
infections in cystic fi brosis.
A different type of public good that 
is not a chemical compound is the light 
produced by some bioluminescent 
bacteria. When the bacteria form a 
mutually benefi cial relationship with 
marine animals, the light serves to 
attract prey or distract predators. 
Finally, examples of more complex 
forms of microbial behavior are 
the fruiting bodies — multicellular, 
stalked sporangia that are formed by 
myxobacteria and social amoebae. 
Here, the entire structure may be 
considered the public good, as it is the 
product of cooperation.
Another characteristic of public 
goods is that their benefi t generally 
increases with population density. 
This aspect is easy to understand in 
the context of antibiotics or secreted 
enzymes. Antibiotics are only effective 
against competitors above a certain 
threshold concentration and therefore 
require an appropriately high density 
of cells that contribute to antibiotic 
production. Similarly, as population 
density increases, secreted enzymes 
that process nutrients progressively 
benefi t neighboring cells rather 
than diffuse away. These properties 
presumably are a major reason why 
the production of many public goods is 
controlled by quorum sensing. Quorum 
sensing can therefore be understood 
as a mechanism of facultative 
cooperation, where signaling with 
relatively cheap public goods serves to 
limit the production of more expensive 
public goods to the appropriate social 
and environmental conditions. 
Basic features of microbial cheating
In microbial populations, public goods 
are readily shared, and thus they 
can be easily exploited by cheaters. 
Cheaters are non-cooperating 
